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EIGHTH AMENDMENT-THE EXCESSIVE
FINES CLAUSE
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Austin v. United States,1 the United States Supreme Court
unanimously held that civil in rem forfeitures must comply with the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 2 In so doing, the
Court reversed a substantial body of precedent, including the rulings of several circuit courts of appeal and its own dicta. This Note
argues that this result is in accord with other recent Court decisions
applying Bill of Rights protections to civil contexts, and that the decision extends an important protection to defendants who face the
power of the government in civil rather than criminal court. However, the Court was sharply divided on the question of whether a
completely innocent owner of guilty property could be deprived of
it constitutionally. Since this issue was not directly raised in Austin,
and the disposition did not rest on it, the actual innocence issue
clouds what otherwise might have been a clear affirmation of the
right of civil defendants to Eighth Amendment protection when
they are sued by the government.
II.

BACKGROUND

Civil in rem forfeiture provides distinct advantages over traditional criminal proceedings to law enforcement officials seeking to
combat drug dealing. In rem forfeiture is based on the fiction that
the property sought is in some way guilty; a forfeiture proceeding is
therefore directed against the property, not its owner.3 The required burden of proof is much easier to meet when the government acts as plaintiff rather than prosecutor. The initial burden on
the government in an action in rem is merely to show that probable
cause existed to believe that property was used or intended for illicit
1 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
2 Id. at 2803.
3 See United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom.
Austin v. United States 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
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purposes. 4 If the government makes this showing, the burden shifts
to the property owner to provide evidence that the property in question is not subject to forfeiture. 5 In addition to procedural incentives, civil forfeiture actions provide tangible rewards to the
government. Unlike incarceration, for instance, which is a drain on
the resources of the state, forfeiture produces revenue for the government, since the government acquires title to the forfeited
6
property.
As the war on drugs has escalated, the federal government has
declared asset forfeiture "one of the most powerful law enforcement
weapons" available. 7 States, with the strong encouragement of the
federal government, have strengthened their own forfeiture laws,
and receive a share of assets seized under federal law. 8 However,
civil forfeiture is not a new invention. Rather, it arises out of prerevolutionary English Common Law. 9
Common law recognized the deodand, by which the value of an
inanimate object that caused an accidental death was forfeited to the
crown.10 Although it originated as a form of religious expiation for
causing the death of another, the deodand continued after it lost
religious significance, justified as a form of punishment for negligence.'" Similarly, conviction for treason at common law was
grounds for forfeiture of estate. 12 The gravity of the felon's offense
was held to justify stripping him of property rights.l 3 Statutory forfeitures arose out of the combined legacy of deodands and forfeiture of estate. 1 4 This type of forfeiture made ships operating in
See United States v. 3639-2nd St., 869 F.2d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 1983).
Id.
21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1992) (attorney general may retain, sell, or distribute forfeited
property).
4
5
6

7 OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 28

(Feb. 1991).
8 Id.

9 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680 (1974).
10 Id. at 680-81.
11 The Crown was to apply the proceeds of the deodand to seeing that proper
prayers were said for the dead person, or other charitable uses. Id. at 681 (citing Exodus
21:28; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300; 1 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 419, 423-24 (Ist Am. ed. 1847); 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W.

473 (2d ed. 1909); Law of Deodands 34 LAW MAG.
188, 189 (1845); Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some HistoricalPerspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169,
MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

182 (1973)).
12 Id. at 682 (citing 3 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 68-71 (3d
ed. 1927); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

351 (2d ed. 1909)).
'13 Id. (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
14 Id.

COMMENTARIES

*299).
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violation of customs laws and their cargoes forfeitable.' 5 Although
deodands and forfeiture of estate never became part of American
common law, the tradition of in rem forfeitures survived. Statutory
forfeitures were among the earliest acts passed by the United
16
States.
The guilty property fiction has historically prevented property
owners from arguing their own innocence as a defense to civil forfeiture. 17 In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,18 the United
States Supreme Court reversed a district court decision that an
owner was deprived of due process when his boat was forfeited due
to a drug violation in which he was not involved.' 9 In holding that
ignorance of illegal activity that occurs on one's property does not
immunize the property from forfeiture, the Court cited a long line
of decisions rejecting innocent ownership as a defense to forfeiture. 20 Among the cases cited were The Palmyra2 1 and United States v.
Brig Malek Adhel. 22 In both cases ships were held forfeitable for
piracy, regardless of whether their owners were aware of how the
ships were used. 28 The Pearson Yacht Court did not, however, completely ignore the culpability of the property owner. The Court concluded that subjecting even "innocent" owners to the threat of
forfeiture served legitimate government ends by encouraging these
owners to monitor the use of their property. 24 However, if the
owner could prove that the property in question was, for instance,
stolen from him, the Court said that "it would be difficult to reject
the [innocent owner's] constitutional claim." ' 25 Recently, the Court
has held that the due process rights of innocent owners must be
protected in some civil forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) by
26
providing all owners with pre-seizure notice.
15 Id. at 683 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *261-62; CJ.Hendry
Co.v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 137-38 (1943)).
16 Id. at 683 (citing Act ofJuly 31, 1789, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 39,47; Act of Aug. 4, 1790,
§§ 13, 22, 27, 28, 67, 1 Stat. 157, 161, 163, 176).
17 Id.
18 Id.

at 663.
19 Id. 676-77.
20 Id. at 683-86.
21 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
22 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
23 Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14; Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 237.
24 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687-88 (1974).
25 Id. at 689.
26 See United States v. James Good Real Property, No. 92-1180, 1993 U.S. LEXIS
7941, at *23-*24 (Dec. 13, 1993) (property owner who pled guilty to drug crime may
have Fifth Amendment right to pre-seizure hearing; courts must weigh government necessity of immediate control of property against owner's interest in maintaining effective
ownership).
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Although the Eighth Amendment provides a substantive check
on the sovereign power to interfere with individual liberty by
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments, the Excessive Fines
Clause 27 prohibition has received very little attention either from
the framers of the Constitution or from the Supreme Court. The
first Supreme Court decision interpreting the Excessive Fines
Clause involved a 1989 punitive damages case. 28 In Browning-Ferris,
a garbage collection company held liable under state law for unfair
trade practices argued that the six million dollar punitive damage
award against it was an excessive fine, since the jury had awarded
only $51,146 in compensatory damages. 29 The Court denied the
Eighth Amendment claim and held that interpretation of the
amendment should be guided by the meaning of the amendment at
the time it was adopted. 30 That historical meaning derived directly
from the Court's interpretation of the English Bill of Rights of 1689,
upon which the Eighth Amendment is patterned. 3 1 The Court decided that, since the time of its adoption, the purpose of the amendment has been to limit the abuse of the government's prosecutorial
power. 32 While Browning-Ferris did not ultimately invalidate a civil
penalty under the Eighth Amendment, it firmly established that the
Excessive Fines provision was intended to limit government's power
to punish individuals, and was not limited by the procedural form of
such a punishment.
Although it did not do so in Browning-Ferris, the Court has applied Bill of Rights protections to defendants who were taken into
civil court by the government. The punishment sought by the government in a civil matter may be so punitive as to render that proceeding a criminal prosecution for the purposes of Fifth and Sixth
Amendment analysis.3 3 The Court makes this determination by
examining whether the purpose of the sanction is remedial-to
compensate the government-or deterrent and retributive-the
34
hallmarks of criminal punishments.
27 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
28 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257

(1989).
29 Id.

at 262.

30 Id. at 264 n.4.
31 Id. at 266.
32 Id. at 267.
33 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (United States cannot strip

a military deserter of citizenship without affording him the protections of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, despite the fact that the law providing this sanction is not explicitly a
criminal law).
34 Id. at 168.
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More importantly, however, the Court has decided that Bill of
Rights protections can apply to defendants in purely civil proceedings when the government is the plaintiff.3 5 In United States v.

Halper,36 the defendant was convicted of making sixty-five false
Medicare claims for which he was given a criminal penalty of two
years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. 3 7 The government then sued

Halper under the civil False Claims Act, under which he was liable
for more than $130,000.38 Halper contended that this was a second

punishment for the same act, and therefore was prohibited by the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 3 9 The Supreme
Court agreed, holding that punishment was imposed by such a civil
40
penalty, and that the defendant could not be punished twice.
Although it noted that status as a criminal proceeding determined
whether the Sixth Amendment's procedural safeguards applied, the
Court held that the civil-criminal distinction was not especially
relevant for Double Jeopardy Clause analysis, but rather that the
pertinent question was whether punishment was being imposed. 4 1
Again, the Court decided the issue of what constituted punishment
by looking at the goals of the sanction and by determining whether
those goals met the punitive motives of deterrence and
42
retribution.
Although the circuit courts unanimously refrained from invalidating any forfeiture on Eighth Amendment grounds, their approach to these cases revealed disagreement over the import of
Halper and showed the potential for inconsistent results. In United
States v. 38 Whaler's Cove Drive,43 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit stated that Halperapplied to civil forfeitures but decided that
the issue of whether a forfeiture was punitive under Halper ought to
be considered on a case-by-case basis. 4 4 In judging what constituted punishment, the Second Circuit held that the guilty property
35
36
37
38
39

40

See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
Id.
Id- at 437.
Id. at 438.
Id.

Id. at 448-49.

Id. at 447-48. The Sixth Amendment applies specifically to criminal prosecutions
("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI), while the DoubleJeopardy Clause ("[N]or shall any
41

person be subject to the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. V), like the Eighth Amendment ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.

CONsT. amend. VIII) do not have such a limitation.
42
43
44

Id. at 448.
954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 35-38.
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fiction generally served as evidence that such seizures are remedial
rather than punitive, since in rem forfeitures remove an instrumentality of the crime. 4 5 Ultimately, the Whaler's Cove court decided that
the forfeiture of a $145,000 condominium where only $250 of cocaine was sold was not sufficiently punitive to violate the Eighth
Amendment, since the size of the forfeiture was not grossly different
46
from fines imposed in other jurisdictions.
Although it considered similar factors in United States v. 40 Moon
Hill Road,4 7 the First Circuit reached the opposite conclusion on the
applicability of Halper.4 8 Instead of adopting a case-by-case approach, the court looked to the federal statute authorizing forfeiture
of drug offenders' property and decided that, since the statute
served primarily remedial goals, its forfeiture provisions were not
punitive, and therefore Bill of Rights protections were not
49
implicated.
In a case decided immediately before Halper, the Fourth Circuit
also denied Eighth Amendment protection to a civil forfeiture defendant, although it used the pre-Halper standard by determining
that civil forfeiture was not so punitive as to become a criminal proceeding. 50 The Third Circuit followed the Fourth Circuit's logic explicitly, and reached the same result in a case decided almost a year
after Halper.51
In contrast, the approach used by the Ninth Circuit did not address the question of whether a particular sanction was criminal or
civil. 52 That court held that the Eighth Amendment did not require
a proportionality review comparing the value of the forfeited property to the gravity of the offense charged. 5 3 Instead, the court held
that since the innocence of the owner is not a defense to in rem
forfeiture, it is not necessary, as it is in a criminal case, to weigh the
at 35.
at 31-32, 38-39. The court compared the sentences the defendant could have
faced if convicted of distributing a similar amount of cocaine under various state laws. It
found that he would have faced a $50,000 fine and four months imprisonment in New
York, five years and $100,000 in Vermont, and 20 years and $10,000 in Connecticut.
47 884 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1989).
48 Id. at 43.
45 Id.
46 Id.

49 Id.
50 See United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (4th Cir. 1989).

51 See United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel, 898 F.2d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1990) (in
rem forfeiture statute "is a permissible civil response by Congress. ... In reaching our
conclusions, we are supported by the decision in Santoro, where a similar analysis was
employed, and the same result reached").
52 See United States v. 300 Cove Road, 861 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1988).
53 Id. at 234-35.
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degree of guilt against the size of the imposed punishment.54 Thus,
although the circuit courts of appeal were unified in refusing to invalidate any forfeiture on Eighth Amendment grounds, they approached the issue of the constitutionality of in rem forfeitures from
varying, and potentially contradictory, perspectives.
III.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 13, 1990, a government informant accompanied Keith
Engebretson to Garretson Body Shop in Garretson, South Dakota,
where Engebretson intended to buy cocaine. 55 The body shop's
owner, Richard Lyle Austin, agreed to sell Engebretson two grams
of cocaine for an unknown amount of money.5 6 Austin then left to
go to his residence, a nearby mobile home; when he returned, he
sold the cocaine to Engebretson. 57 The next day, state law enforcement officials obtained and executed a warrant to search the body
shop and the mobile home.58 In the body shop, officers discovered
a .22 caliber revolver, a small amount of marijuana, $3,300 in cash,
and cocaine paraphernalia. 5 9 The search of the mobile home disclosed an electronic scale, two small containers of cocaine, a small
bag of marijuana and $660 in cash.6 0 Austin was indicted in state
court on four drug-related counts. 6 1 He pled guilty to one count of
possession of a controlled drug with intent to distribute. 62 The
other charges were dismissed, and Austin was sentenced to seven
63
years in prison.
The United States instituted a civil forfeiture action, pursuant
to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), 6 4 against Austin's body shop
and mobile home, which had a combined value of approximately
54 Id.
55 Brief for The United States at 4, Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993)

(No. 92-6073).
56 Id at 4-5.
57 Idr

58 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (No. 92-

6073).
59 United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 815-16 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub
nom. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
60 Id.

61 Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Austin (No. 92-6073).
62 Id. at 6.
63 Id.

64 The civil forfeiture statute provides:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All... equipment of any kind which [is] used, or intended for use, in...
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Supported by the affidavit of a Sioux Falls Police Officer
that described the drug sale, the resulting search, and Austin's
guilty plea, the government moved for summary judgment. 66
Although Austin opposed the motion on the grounds that forfeiture
would constitute an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment, his affidavit did not rebut the government's factual allegations. 6 7 The district court granted the United States' motion for
summary judgment and entered a decree of forfeiture against Aus68
tin's property.
Austin appealed, contending that the summary judgment was
unwarranted because a material issue of fact existed. 69 He also contended that the forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment because
it was an excessive fine as well as a cruel and unusual punishment. 70
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that no genuine
issue of material fact existed, but agreed only "reluctantly" with the
$37,000.65

processing [or] delivering . . . any controlled substance in violation of this sub-

chapter.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for property
described in paragraph (1) [or] (2) ...
(4) All conveyances ... [or] vehicles.., which are used, or are intended for use
... in any manner to facilitate the ... sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of
property described in paragraph (1) [or] (2) ....
except that-

(A) no conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction
of business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section unless it shall appear that the owner or other person in charge of such conveyance was a consenting party or privy to a violation of this subchapter or subchapter
II of this chapter;
(B) no conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section by
reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have been committed or omitted by any person other than such owner while such conveyance was
unlawfully in the possession of a person other than the owner in violation of the
criminal laws of the United States, or of any State; and
(C) no conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to
have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner.
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or
improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable
by more than one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited
under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act
or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without
the knowledge or consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1992).
65 Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, Austin (No. 92-6073).
66 United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'dsub nom.
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
67 Id. at 816-17.
68 Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Austin (No. 92-6073).
69 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d at 816-17.
70 Id. at 817.
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government's position that the Eighth Amendment was inapplicable
to the case. 7 1 The Eighth Circuit noted that the principle of proportionality is an integral part of the common law and that fairness requires its application in a civil context if "harsh penalties" may be
imposed. 7 2 Nevertheless, the court held that, because civil forfeiture actions are technically different from criminal proceedings, the
prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment do not limit the government's power to seize property when it proceeds against the property itself 7 3 Since a civil forfeiture is an action in rem rather than in
personam, the court said that the relevant issue is the relationship
between the property and the prohibited conduct, not the guilt or
innocence of the owner.7 4 Thus, the court followed the Ninth Circuit approach and concluded that, if the Constitution allows completely innocent owners to forfeit offending property, it cannot
require an examination of the degree of a blameworthy actor's cul75
pability before his property may be seized.
Despite its holding, the Eighth Circuit reiterated its uneasiness
with the result. 76 It expressed reservations about disallowing constitutional review of such a powerful government tool solely on narrow technical grounds: "Legal niceties such as in rem and in personam
mean little to individuals faced with losing important and/or valuable assets."' 7 7 The court admitted being "troubled" with the idea
that any property, no matter how valuable, could be subject to forfeiture because the owner commits a single drug-related crime, noting that "[i]n this case it does appear that government is exacting
too high a penalty in relation to the offense committed." 78 The
court suggested that Austin's position might be supported by the
Supreme Court's ruling in Browning-Ferris, which held that the
Eighth Amendment was intended to limit the "prosecutorial" power
of the government. 79 Ultimately, however, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the in rem nature of the forfeiture proceeding
prevented the use of the Eighth Amendment to remedy this appar80
ent injustice.
71 Id.

72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.

75 Id. (citing United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989)).
76 Id. at 817-18.
77 Id. at 818.

78 Id.
79 Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266
(1989)).
80 Id.
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THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of excessive
fines applies to in rem civil forfeiture actions.8 1
In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, holding that the
government's seizure of Austin's property was a punitive fine, subject to the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, despite the
fact that the forfeiture was imposed in a civil, rather than a criminal,
82
proceeding.
A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court.8 3 The
Court described the purpose of the Eighth Amendment as discussed
in the Browning-Ferris decision. 84 The determinative factor in that
case, as the Court described it, was the history of the Eighth Amendment, which was designed to restrict the ability of the government
to impose punishment.8 5 Thus, "the Excessive Fines Clause was intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and payable to,
86
the government."
The Court decided that the appropriate question was not, as
the United States argued, whether a civil forfeiture is so punitive as
to necessitate the constitutional protections reserved for criminal
defendants 8 7 Unlike the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the text of
the Eighth Amendment does not specifically limit its protection to
criminal cases, and the Amendment's legislative history, although
sparse, does not reveal that any such limitation was intended.8 8 As
the Court framed it, the threshold issue for Eighth Amendment application is not whether a penalty is criminal or civil in nature, but
rather whether it is a punishment.8 9
The Court reviewed the punitive aspects of the three types of
forfeiture established by English law at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified. 90 Although religious in origin, the deodand, by
81 Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1036 (1993).
82 Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993).
83 Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices White, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter.
84 Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257 (1989)).
85 Id.
86 Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 268).
87 Id. at 2806.
88 Id. at 2805.
89 Id. at 2806.
90 Id. at 2806-07.
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which the value of property that caused an accidental death was forfeited to the crown, eventually came to be viewed as a penalty for
the negligence of its owner.9 1 Statutory forfeiture of ships and
cargo involved in violations of customs laws such as the Navigation
Acts, were justified, at least in part, by the owner's culpability in not
9 2 Most
ensuring that his property was used in a lawful manner.
dearly punitive was the forfeiture of estate, by which a convicted
felon or traitor was stripped of all property. 93 While deodand apparently was never common in the United States, and forfeiture of
estate was constitutionally and statutorily limited, the Court noted
that the First Congress embraced the English practice of subjecting
ships and cargoes involved in customs violations to forfeiture.9 4 In
support of its position, the Court cited the Act of July 31, 1789,
which listed forfeiture as a punishment for illegally unloading a ship
and also used the word "forfeit" as a synonym for "fine." 95
The Court held that its repeated rejection of so-called innocent
ownership as a common law defense to in rem forfeiture was not
inconsistent with the position that such forfeiture is a punishment.
The traditional fiction that the property itself is guilty rests on an
assumption that the owner has been negligent, and the Court did
not read any of its cases to apply the guilty-property fiction when
"the owner [has] done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the unlawful use of his property." 96 Similarly, while it had upheld in rem forfeitures caused only by the wrongs of employees or
lessees, the Court saw a punitive aspect to such vicarious liability,
which sanctions an owner for irresponsibly entrusting property to
an untrustworthy party. 9 7 The Court also pointed out that on other
occasions it has explicitly reserved the question of whether the Constitution protects a truly blameless owner from forfeiting property,
which would not be an issue if forfeiture was not a type of punishment. 9 8 Again in Austin, the Court specifically refrained from addressing this issue.9 9 The Court concluded that the legal history of
statutory in rem forfeiture reveals that it has been consistently
91 Id. at 2806.

Id. at 2807.
Id. at 2806-07.
94 Id. at 2807-08.
95 Id. (citing the Act ofJuly 31, 1789, § 12, 1 Stat. 39).
96 Id at 2808-09.
97 Id. at 2809-10.
98 Id. at 2809 (citing Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512 (1921);
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974)).
99 Id. at 2809 n.10.
92
93
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viewed as a punishment, at least in part. 0 0
The Court held that, just as forfeiture has traditionally been
considered a punishment, seizures under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (4) and
(a)(7) are punitive. In determining that the purpose of the forfeiture statute is punishment, the Court was particularly influenced by
two specific aspects of the law. First, the innocent owner provisions
in the section ensure that those who do not willfully participate in
drug crimes are immune from forfeiture.' 0 ' Second, the fact that
Congress explicitly linked the forfeiture provisions to drug crimes
suggested to the Court that it had a punitive motive, an impression
reinforced by legislative history, which revealed a desire to create
02
both deterrence and retribution.1
The Court also rejected the argument that the forfeiture statute
can fairly be read as a remedial provision rather than as a punishment. While the Court recognized that the seizure of inherently
hazardous or illegal contraband is a remedial measure that directly
protects society, a motor home, like Austin's, is not dangerous in
and of itself, and its forfeiture cannot be justified on these
grounds.' 0 3 The Court also decided that the forfeiture was not remedial in the sense that it compensated the government for law
enforcement and other expenditures needed to combat drug trafficking and abuse.' 0 4 Since there is no necessary relationship
between the size of these enforcement expenditures and the value of
the assets subject to forfeiture in a particular case, the Court held
that this provision was not compensatory. 10 5 Thus, the Court held
that the test it established in Browning-Ferriswas met by the seizure
of Austin's property. 10 6 His forfeiture was a " 'payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense,' and as such [was] subject to
the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
07
Clause."1
However, the Court declined Austin's invitation to fashion a
test to determine whether a fine is excessive and instead remanded
08
the case to the district court for consideration of this issue.'
100
101
102
103

Id. at 2810.
Id. at 2810-11.

104

Id. at 2811-12.
Id. at 2812.

105

Id. at 2811 (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191, 195 (1983)).
Id.

106 Id.
107 Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265

(1989)).
108 Id.

1994]
B.

CIVIL FORFEITURE

817

JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE

Justice Scalia agreed with the Court that the Browning-Ferristest
had been met, but felt that this result could have been reached without addressing, as the Court did, the question of whether innocent
ownership constitutes a defense to in rem proceedings.1 0 9 Justice
Scalia argued that the Court's approach unnecessarily weakened the
distinction between in rem and in personam actions. 1 10
Justice Scalia described in personam forfeitures as "assessments, whether monetary or in-kind, to punish the property owner's
criminal conduct, while [in rem forfeitures] are confiscations of
property rights based on improper use of the property, regardless
of whether the owner has violated the law.""' Both are punishments, Justice Scalia argued, since they are not designed to compensate an aggrieved party, but to deprive the owner of the use of his
lawful property. 1 2 He derided the lengths the Court went to in interpreting in rem forfeitures as necessarily requiring the actual culpability of the property owner.1 3 There is no constitutional reason,
he argued, that a blameless actor is immune from in rem forfeiture. 1 14 Indeed, if the culpability of the owner is a requirement for
in rem forfeiture, then there is effectively no difference between in
rem and in personam forfeitures. 1 15 Additionally, Justice Scalia
considered the question reserved by the Court regarding whether
the Constitution allows an in rem forfeiture against a truly innocent
owner to be nonsensical if such forfeitures are, by definition, only
visited on owners who have actual culpability. 1 16 In any case, the
forfeiture statute at issue in this case had an innocent owner provi1 17
sion that required the actual blameworthiness of the owner.
This, as the Court discussed, clearly makes it punitive; in Justice
Scalia's view, this fact made the Court's historical discussion of for18
feitures dicta."
Although he agreed with the Court that the question of excessiveness must be remanded, Justice Scalia described the method of
analysis he would use to determine if an in rem forfeiture is exces109 Id. at 2813 (Scalia, J., concurring).
110 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
111 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).

112 Id. at 2813-14 (Scalia, J., concurring).,
113 Id. at 2814 (Scalia, J., concurring).
114 Id (Scalia, J., concurring).
1 15 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
116 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
117 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
118 Id (Scalia, J., concurring).
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sive.11 9 He contended that the value of forfeited property is not relevant to the excessiveness inquiry, but rather that the determinative
issue is the degree to which the property is involved in the commission of an unlawful act. 120 An action in rem rests, he argued, on the
guilty property fiction; thus, the question ought to be how guilty is
the property, not the offender. 1 2 ' Under this standard, Justice
Scalia would hold that any item that is a necessary instrumentality of
the offense is forfeitable, while forfeiture of property that is tangential to the commission of the crime is prohibited by the Excessive
122
Fines Clause.
C.

JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE

In a short concurrence, Justice Kennedy 123 agreed with Justice
Scalia that the majority's attempt to portray forfeiture as requiring
actual culpability of the owner was potentially misleading and was
not necessary to reach its decision. 124
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy did not agree that the case
law indicates that in rem forfeitures are necessarily based on the actual culpability of the owner. 12 5 While he indicated some concern
that forfeiture by a truly innocent owner might be unconstitutional,
Justice Kennedy criticized the historical analysis employed by the
Court, arguing that actual innocence was not an issue in this case,
since Austin was not an innocent owner. 12 6 He was equally unwilling to endorse Justice Scalia's position that all in rem forfeitures are
punishments, writing that the disposition of this case did not require
such a conclusion.127
V.

ANALYSIS

Although it reversed the unanimous view of the circuit courts of
appeal, the Court's decision that in rem forfeiture was subject to
Eighth Amendment protection was unsurprising in light of its recent
decisions applying the protections of the Bill of Rights to civil contexts. Despite the fact that this result was a logical extension of its
own precedents, the Court deviated from the simple, compelling ar119 Id. at 2814-15 (Scalia, J., concurring).
120 Id. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring).
121 Id. (Scalia,J., concurring).
122 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
123 ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined in Justice Kennedy's opinion.
124 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
125 Id. at 2815-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126 Id. at 2816 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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gument of those cases into a discussion of the basis for the in rem/in
personam distinction, a digression which unnecessarily obscured
the reasoning of the Austin decision. Although this dispute confused
the Court's previously clear position on the relevance of innocence
in in rem proceedings, it did provide some indication of the kind of
excessiveness test the Court might establish in future Excessive
Fines Clause cases.
A.

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT LIMITS GOVERNMENT'S POWER TO
IMPOSE PUNITIVE IN REM FORFEITURES

The result in Austin was clearly foreshadowed by two other decisions authored by Justice Blackmun which held that the Bill of
Rights places substantive limits on the government's power to punish, regardless of whether such punishment occurs in a criminal proceeding or a civil one. If the Court had merely followed the
2 9 the resulting decompelling logic of Halper 28 and Browning-Ferris,1
cision would have been much clearer.
In Halper, the Court first explicitly held that the protections
against arbitrary and excessive punishment embodied in the Bill of
Rights must be observed even when the government chooses to proceed against an individual in a civil proceeding.13 0 Previously, the
Court had decided that actions taken by the government in a civil
proceeding can be so punitive as to necessitate giving the defendant
13
the constitutional protections reserved for criminal defendants. '
The Halper Court greatly extended the scope of Bill of Rights protections, however, by holding that they apply whenever a civil penalty constitutes a punishment, even if the punishment is not so harsh
as to render it criminal in nature. 13 2 This holding provides the first
prong of the more straightforward ruling the Court should have
made in Austin.
Halper offered two tests to evaluate whether a penalty was a
punishment. The majority held that a civil penalty is punitive if its
application in a particular case serves retributive and deterrent
goals, even though it may also have a remedial purpose. 13 3 In contrast, Justice Kennedy, concurring in Halper, outlined a much simpler and more objective test for punishment. 134 Kennedy argued
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963).
Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
Id
Id. at 452-53 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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that the determination of punishment is not a sweeping search for
motivations and goals of punishment, but rather whether a civil penalty is rationally related to the size of damages incurred by the government in a particular case.' 3 5 Although Justices Blackmun and
Kennedy both stressed the limited nature of the Halper decision,
there was nothing in the logic of the holding that restricted it to
double jeopardy analysis or to cases in which the government seeks
to impose fines on individuals, rather than forfeitures. Indeed,
under either the majority or Justice Kennedy's analysis, the action
taken against Austin constitutes a punishment, and it is not particularly relevant to either formulation whether innocent owners should
be immune from forfeiture.
Instead of delving into the history of forfeiture, the Court could
have limited its argument to the evidence of punitive intent it found
in the legislative history of the drug-trafficking-based forfeiture
36
laws, and especially in the innocent owner defense provision.
The Court rejected the government's contention that an in rem proceeding against a drug dealer is merely an attempt to recover the
costs of combatting drug-related crime.' 3 7 Both the punitive and
retributive aspects of punishment are present in such an action,
while the remedy the government seeks is unrelated to the damages
or costs it actually incurred.13 8 The innocent ownership exceptions
further bolster the conclusion that forfeiture is punitive. Analyzing
these factors under the standard enunciated in Halper would have
demonstrated that the forfeiture of Austin's home and business was
a punishment, without entangling the Court in the controversial actual innocence issue.
If the Court had followed this outline, the second key point of
its decision could have been enunciated clearly by referring to the
Browning-Ferris case. While the Fifth Amendment protection implicated in Halper prevents two punishments for the same crime, the
limitation Austin sought was based on the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of excessive fines. To provide this protection, that
clause must protect the kind of interest Austin argued is violated by
the government's action.
In Browning-Ferris, the decision turned on measuring the extent
to which punitive damage awards in favor of private parties are punishments inflicted by the government.' 3 9 While disagreeing about
135
136
137

138
'39

Id. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2811-12 (1993).
Id. at 2112.
Id. at 2812.
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263-64 (1989).
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whether civil damage awards have ever been protected by the Eighth
Amendment or its historical predecessor in the English Bill of
Rights, both the majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's dissent
agreed that the Excessive Fines Clause was intended to limit the
government's punitive power.
It is relatively clear, especially given the way the Court read the
legislative history, that civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 was
intended to enhance the prosecutorial power of government. In arguing that excessive punitive damages are unconstitutional, Justice
O'Connor analogized to the criminal law, citing the purposes of deterrence and retribution at the heart of both. 140 The forfeiture action in Austin is even more closely analogous to a criminal
proceeding, resting, as it does, on Austin's criminal conviction for
selling drugs. The Browning-Ferris Court embraced the notion that
the purpose of the Eighth Amendment was to curb government's
power to punish-its "prosecutorial" power.1 41 If this had been the
emphasis in Austin, the underlying purpose of the Eighth Amendment protections could have been described more clearly.
Although dicta in Browning-Ferris suggested that the Eighth
Amendment does not cover any civil proceeding, 14 2 the Court reserved this question.' 4 3 In fact, the logic of that case mandates that
excessive fines protection be extended to the forfeiture proceeding
against Austin. The Browning-Ferris Court held that "'fine' was understood to mean payment to a sovereign as punishment for some
offense."' 144 Austin's forfeiture of his home and business to the
state is a retributive payment, received by the state. Browning-Ferris
limited application of the Eighth Amendment to "steps a government may take against an individual" and denied that punitive damage awards fell within this limited class because the government did
not use "the civil courts to extract large payments or forfeitures for
the purpose of ... disabling some individual."' 14 5 In Austin, that is
exactly what the government did, and no matter what status punitive
damages between private parties have, the Browning-Ferris decision
mandates that if a civil action seeks a punitive forfeiture to the government, it violates the Eighth Amendment if it is excessive.
As Justice Scalia's concurrence pointed out, the holdings in
Id. at 287 (0' Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 266.
Id. at 262 ("Given that the [Eighth] Amendment is addressed to bail, fines, and
punishments, our cases long have understood it to apply primarily, and perhaps exclusively, to criminal prosecutions and punishments.").
143 Id. at 263.
144 Id. at 265.
145 Id. at 275.
140
141
142
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Halper and Browning-Ferris present a straightforward argument for
the result in Austin. 146 The forfeiture at issue in Austin meets the
definition of punishment described in Halper, and such a punishment, if sought by the government, is limited by the Eighth Amendment under Browning-Ferris. The Court, however, declined to follow
this simple outline, and instead devoted much of its opinion to exploring the question of whether in rem forfeitures may be considered punishments. 14 7 The key problem for the Court is apparently
the paradox that led the Eighth Circuit to decide that this case was
outside the bounds of protection of the Excessive Fines Clause.' 48
That court could not reconcile the fact that a totally blameless
owner of property could constitutionally forfeit that property, while
Austin, a convicted felon, was entitled to a balancing of his crime's
seriousness against the size of the forfeiture. 14 9 Since an innocent
owner's forfeiture seemed automatically excessive but was not prevented by the Eighth Amendment, a blameful owner could not be so
protected. The Supreme Court addressed this conundrum by denying that it had ever held that a blameless owner could constitutionally be deprived of guilty property. 150 Instead, the Court read all of
its prior decisions on in rem proceedings to assume that the owner
of the property sought for forfeiture was in some way negligentactually, presumably, or vicariously-for allowing its wrongful
use. 15 1 Justice Scalia argued vigorously that an in rem forfeiture is
2
always punitive, even to an actually innocent owner. 15
While this dispute would be important for establishing a standard for excessiveness, it was irrelevant to the issues reached by the
Court in the Austin decision. Austin was not an innocent owner, and
the statute under which he was punished contains several defenses
for innocent owners. 15 3 It was unnecessary to hold that all in rem
forfeitures require actual culpability. The individualized standard
for degree of punishment established in Halper requires looking at
the facts of a particular government action, rather than an entire
class of such actions. Since this discussion was not dispositive of an
issue it actually decided, the Court should have either avoided it, as
Justice Scalia argued, or explicitly made it dicta.
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2813-14 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2806-10.
United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 817 (1992), rev'd sub nom. Austin
v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
149 Id.
150 Austin, 113 S. Ct at 2809.
146

147
148

151 Id. at 2809-10.
152

Id. at 2813-14 (ScaliaJ., concurring).

153 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4), (7) (1992). See supra note 64 for text of the statute.
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The Court contended that Justices Scalia and Kennedy misunderstood the actual innocence discussion, which the Court argued
was necessary to show that forfeiture serves, at least partially, to
punish. 15 4 Justice Scalia denied this was the source of his disagreement, and argued that a forfeiture is implicitly punitive; otherwise,
he asserted, a forfeiture would not constitute a fine. 15 5 Because the
Justices could not agree on what it was they disagreed about, they
did not make the clearest possible statement emphasizing the fundamental nature of the issues on which they agreed. While the Court
is, of course, free to be as Delphic in its pronouncements as it
wishes, the confusion in Austin was unfortunate for two reasons.
The Court blurred what seemed to be established distinctions between in rem and in personam forfeitures, simultaneously sacrificing
analytical clarity, to introduce an issue that was not raised by the
case. Additionally, the Court discussed the important issues underlying a test for excessiveness, despite its claims that it was not addressing that question.
While the Court's decision was compelled by the well-reasoned
holdings of Halper and Browning-Ferris, the concurrences were correct in noting that since the issue of innocent ownership of property
forfeited in rem was not directly presented by this case, it should not
have been addressed.
B.

THE STANDARD FOR EXCESSIVENESS

The Court left completely open the question of how the exces156 Of
siveness of an in rem forfeiture should be judged on remand.
the two tests that have been proposed, the Court's discussion of actual innocence of the owner in a civil forfeiture context suggests that
it will choose a standard in keeping with the type of proportionality
test it has used in other Eighth Amendment contexts.
Austin argued that the Court should rule his forfeiture excessive under a proportionality test like the one described in Solem v.
Helm. 15 7 In that case, the Court described several "objective factors" to be used in evaluating whether a punishment was cruel and
unusual.' 5 8 These factors included the gravity of the offense, the
harshness of the penalty imposed, the relative seriousness of
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and
154
155
156
157

Id. at 2810 n.12.
Id. at 2814 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2812.
463 U.S. 277 (1983), cited in Brief for Petitioner at 9, Austin v. United States, 113
S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (No. 92-6073).
158 Solem, 463 U.S. at 290.
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the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.1 59 In her partial concurrence in the Browning-Ferris
case, Justice O'Connor proposed that such a proportionality test
should apply in a punitive damages case.' 60 Justice O'Connor added that courts should give "substantial deference" to the legislature in determining appropriate levels of punishment. 16 ' This type
of test would be consistent with the Court's Eighth Amendment approach to death penalty cases in which the Court has closely tied the
allowable gravity of punishment to the culpability of the individual
offender.' 6 2 It necessitates a case-by-case comparison of the punishment's effects with those handed out to other individuals under similar circumstances.
In his Austin concurrence, Justice Scalia proposed an excessiveness test that looks at the relationship of the guilty property to the
wrongful conduct, rather than at the relationship between the magnitude of punishment and the defendant's culpability.' 63 This instrumentality test would hold a forfeiture excessive if the property
sought to be confiscated is not sufficiently related to the commission
of the prohibited conduct.' 64
As Justice Scalia pointed out,
"[s]cales used to measure out unlawful drug sales ...are confiscable
whether made of the purest gold or the basest metal."' 16 5 The petitioner apparently argued for this type of test before the district
court, which rejected it, saying "undisputed facts established a sufficient nexus between the two properties and petitioner's drug transactions" to defeat any Eighth Amendment claims. 16 6
Unlike a proportionality test, an instrumentality test divorces
the conduct of the offender from the punishment, and instead relies
on the relationship between the property and the crime to establish
allowable liability. Differentiating between these types of tests illuminates what the Court and Justice Scalia were really arguing
about when they addressed the actual innocence issue in in rem forfeiture proceedings. The disagreement in Austin has its roots in the
Court's disagreement over the proper standard for determining the
excessiveness of a non-capital criminal penalty under the Cruel and
159 Id. at 290-92.

160 Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 300-01 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
161 Id. at 301 (0' Connor, J., concurring).
162 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
163 Austin v United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2814-15 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
164 Id. at 2815 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
165 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
166 Brief for The United States at 6, Austin v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801 (1993)
(No. 92-6073).
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Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. In Harmelin
v. Michigan,16 7 the Court decided that a mandatory term of life in
prison for cocaine possession was not a cruel and unusual punish168
ment, but divided sharply on the issue of proportionality.
Although Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, he was
joined only by ChiefJustice Rehnquist in deciding that there was no
proportionality requirement embodied in the Eighth Amendment,
except for the unique instance where the death penalty is to be imposed.1 69 In contrast, the dissent argued that the individualized
proportionality standard of Solem was appropriate to judge even
non-capital cases. 170 Justice Kennedy's concurrence took the middle road, outlining a "narrow proportionality standard," which deferred significantly to legislative judgment to determine appropriate
1 71
sentences.
These three views delineate the differences among the Austin
opinions. The argument of the Harmelin dissent-that proportionality is always required by the Eighth Amendment-is incompatible
with the rejection of the innocent owner defense. Such a test tailors
the degree of punishment to the culpability of an actor. If this test
permits an owner with no culpability to receive some punishment, it
cannot conceivably invalidate any punishment as excessive. Thus, if
the proportionality test is to be the Court's method for judging excessiveness under the Eighth Amendment, it must demonstrate, at
least, that it has never allowed a true innocent's property to be
confiscated.
Since Justice Scalia rejected proportionality in Harmelin, he
would have used a differeit concept to measure the excessiveness of
a fine. Justice Scalia's proposed instrumentality standard relies
heavily on the in rem guilty property fiction to determine the
bounds of excessiveness. Thus, the erosion of the in rem/in personam distinction which he saw in the Court's decision threatens the
very basis for the excessiveness test he proposed. Likewise, Justice
Kennedy's avoidance of the actual innocence issue in Austin paralleled his concurrence in Harmelin. Because his proportionality standard is much more limited than that of the Austin majority, he only
expressed some concern about the plight of an innocent owner,
rather than seeking to read an innocent ownership defense into the
167 111

S. Ct. 2680 (1991).

168 Id.
169
170
171

Id. at 2700-01.
Id. at 2710-12 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2702-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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precedents.1 72
The fact that these differences are much more clearly presented
in looking at potential formulations for an excessiveness test makes
it all the more unfortunate that the Court decided to present these
arguments in a case where it declined to outline such a test. What
the discussion of the actual innocence issue does show, however, is
that the Court is likely to prefer a proportionality test to an instrumentality standard.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Because in rem forfeitures provide law enforcement officials
with advantages not available to them in criminal proceedings, in
Austin v. United States the Supreme Court took an important step in
the protection of individual liberty by holding that such punishments may not be arbitrary or oppressive, despite the fact that the
government does not explicitly forfeitures them as criminal sanctions. However, the Court delineated this principle much less
clearly than it might have by dwelling on the contentious issue of
whether actually innocent owners may forfeit guilty property, an issue which was not directly presented in this case, and a question
whose implications the Court postponed addressing directly.
The dispute over this issue, however, suggests that the Court
views the Excessive Fines Clause as similar in scope to the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause jurisprudence it has constructed in
non-capital cases. While that area of law is itself somewhat unsettled, the Austin decision suggests that the Court will read the Excessive Fines Clause to require that the value of the forfeited property
be not disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime, but will be
willing to defer to legislative judgments in assessing how serious a
crime is.
DAVID LIEBER

172

Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2815-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

